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ABSTRACT
A federal district court in Virginia recently held that
Twitter users have no privacy rights regarding non-content
information associated with their use of Twitter. The court
thus affirmed that the government may obtain Twitter
users’ Internet Protocol (IP) addresses without notice to
the users. The users in this case were alleged to be
members of WikiLeaks. The government obtained an order
of production in connection with grand jury proceedings,
compelling Twitter to turn over IP address data to the
government. After Twitter motioned to have the order
unsealed, the alleged WikiLeaks members unsuccessfully
attempted to intervene to quash the order of production.
The district court found that the users lacked standing to
challenge the order under the Stored Communications Act
(SCA) because Twitter’s terms of use negated any
expectations of privacy and the nature of IP address data
itself requires that users convey IP addresses and
associated information in order to use the Internet. This
Article examines the court’s decision and analysis under
the SCA and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and
discusses the impact of expanded warrantless disclosures
of non-content electronic records.
*
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INTRODUCTION
More Americans are using social media to communicate than
ever before, and using a wide array of devices, from personal
computers to cellular phones, to do so. Online social networking
sites—such as Twitter, Facebook, MySpace, LinkedIn, and
FourSquare—are ubiquitous. For example, Twitter use is
increasingly prevalent among nearly every demographic group in
the United States. A 2011 Pew Research survey found that 13
percent of adults that use the Internet use Twitter. 1 The survey also
found pronounced growth in the number of non-white Twitter
users, as well as significant growth in the number of Twitter users
age 25-44. 2 Such trends appear consistent with the growth of
online social media in general; as of 2011, 65 percent of online
adults used social networking sites such as MySpace, Facebook, or

1

Aaron Smith, Twitter Update 2011, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, June 1,
2011,
http://www.pewresearch.org/pubs/2007/twitter-users-cell-phone-2011demographics.
2
Id.
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LinkedIn. 3 Considering that in February 2005, only 8 percent of
adult Internet users used social networking sites, the pace of
growth for online social networking site is “staggering.” 4
Unlike email messages and other predecessors to modern social
media, communications through online social media are often
publicly available—at least to other members of the social
network. The public nature of many online social networks reduces
or eliminates any expectation of privacy as to the content of the
messages themselves. Government entities pursuing evidence of
criminal activity through the records of online social networking
sites do not always seek the actual content of the communications,
but rather seek the non-content data—including the identity and
location of the user. As a result, questions regarding privacy and
government access to electronic non-content records arise relating
to the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.
(2010). Because non-content data, 5 such as an Internet Protocol
(IP) address, is necessary for communication via the Internet,
many social networking companies routinely retain such
information.
A federal district court in Virginia recently held that the federal
government may obtain Twitter users’ Internet Protocol (IP)
addresses without notice to the users. This decision represents a
3

Mary Madden & Kathryn Zickuhr, 65% of Online Adults Use Social
Aug.
26,
2011,
Networking
Sites,
PEW RESEARCH CENTER,
http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2011/Social-Networking-Sites/Overview.aspx.
4
Id.
5
Non-content information has been described as “the envelope information
needed to deliver a communication from one location to another.” WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, 2 CRIM. PROC. §
4.4(D) (3d ed. 2011). Under the SCA, non-content information includes:
(A) name; (B) address; (C) local and long distance telephone
connection records, or records of session times and durations;
(D) length of service (including start date) and types of service
utilized; (E) telephone or instrument number or other
subscriber number or identity, including any temporarily
assigned network address; and (F) means and source of
payment for such service (including any credit card or bank
account number).”
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) (2010); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL,
NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, 2 CRIM. PROC. § 4.8(C) (3d ed. 2011).
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natural application of existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
applying the SCA. Further, the decision gives notice to both users
and operators of social networks that there is no expectation of
privacy for IP address data transmitted over the Internet—even
when the data is transmitted from a personal computer located in a
private space.
This Article examines the federal district court’s decision and
analysis under SCA and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Then,
this Article discusses the impact of expanded warrantless
disclosures of non-content electronic records on online social
networking sites and users. The Article concludes by noting that
the nature of online communication itself requires that non-content
data be disclosed between machines, meaning that under the SCA,
certain data required for using the Internet is inherently nonprivate.
I. TWITTER AND NON-CONTENT DATA
A. Twitter
Twitter is an online social media network that allows users to
post short messages to one another or to the public. The company’s
website states, “Twitter is a real-time information network that
connects [users] to the latest stories, ideas, opinions and news
about what [users] find interesting.” 6 Twitter users communicate
using “tweets.” Each tweet is up to 140 characters long; users can
share photos, videos and conversations directly in tweets. 7 Twitter
allows users to post tweets and read the tweets of other users via
computers and other mobile devices that connect to the Internet.
Users can monitor, or “follow,” other users’ tweets, and can permit
or forbid access to their own tweets. In addition to posting their
own tweets, users may send messages to a single user (“direct
messages”) or repost other users’ tweets (“retweet”). Each Twitter
user has a unique username, which is associated with that user’s

6

About Twitter, TWITTER.COM, http://twitter.com/about (last visited Jan. 3,

2013).
7

Id.
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tweets, direct messages, and retweets. 8
Twitter requires that users agree to a “clickwrap” 9 agreement
that includes agreeing to Twitter’s Terms of Service and Privacy
Policy as a condition of creating a Twitter account. 10 The Privacy
Policy includes a number of key terms and conditions that relate to
retention of user data. For example, the Privacy Policy as of May
17, 2012 explained that, “We may preserve or disclose your
information if we believe that it is reasonably necessary to comply
with a law, regulation or legal request; to protect the safety of any
person; to address fraud, security or technical issues; or to protect
Twitter's rights or property.” 11 Additionally, the Policy states that:
Our servers automatically record information ("Log
Data") created by your use of the Services. Log
Data may include information such as your IP
address, browser type, operating system, the
referring web page, pages visited, location, your
mobile carrier, device and application IDs, search
terms, and cookie information. We receive Log
Data when you interact with our Services, for
example, when you visit our websites, sign into our
Services, interact with our email notifications, use
your Twitter account to authenticate to a third-party
website or application, or visit a third-party website
that includes a Twitter button or widget. Twitter
uses Log Data to provide our Services and to
measure, customize, and improve them. If not
8

In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§2703(d), 830 F. Supp. 2d 114, 118 (E.D. Va. Nov. 10, 2011) (internal footnotes
omitted); see also Rafe Needleman, Newbie’s guide to Twitter, CNET, March
15, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/newbies-guide-to-twitter/.
9
In computer software, hardware, and Internet transactions terms and
conditions are often contained in a clickwrap agreement—terms and conditions
that appear on the computer screen when the user attempts to install the software
or use the website and require that a consumer agree to the license terms before
being allowed to purchase or use the product or website. 15B AM. JUR. 2D
Computers and the Internet § 105 (2012).
10
In re Application, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 118.
11
Twitter Privacy Policy, TWITTER.COM, May 17, 2012, http://twitter.com/
privacy.
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already done earlier, for example, as provided
below for Widget Data, we will either delete Log
Data or remove any common account identifiers,
such as your username, full IP address, or email
address, after 18 months. 12
Users must acknowledge and agree to this Privacy Policy as a
condition of using Twitter.
B. 18 U.S.C. § 2703: Content or Non-Content Under the SCA
Enacted as Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986, 13 the SCA largely governs the methods and
requirements for government access to electronically stored
communications and the data related to those communications. The
SCA draws an important distinction between content and noncontent information in Section 2703. In addition to establishing the
procedures by which the government may obtain access to
electronic communications and information, the section
distinguishes between “contents” and non-content “records.” 14
The SCA distinguishes between content substance and form.
When the government seeks “information concerning the
substance, purport, or meaning of that communication” (in other
words, content), paragraphs (a) and (b) apply. 15 If, on the other
hand, the government seeks non-content records, paragraph (c)
controls. 16 Section 2703, paragraph (c)(2) lists the type of noncontent data subject to disclosure, including the subscriber or
12

Id.
Pub.L. No. 99–508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2010)). The Electronic Privacy Act of 1986 was enacted
in part to extend enhanced privacy protections to developing forms of
telecommunications and computer technology, including cellular phones,
pagers, and email. See S. Rep. No. 99–541 at 4 (1986), reprinted at 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3559; see generally Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the
Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1208,1209-13 (2008).
14
18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2010); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–
44 (1979).
15
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(8), 2703(a)-(b), 2711(1) (2010).
16
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2010).
13
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customer name, address, telephone connection records or records
of session times and durations, length and type of service used,
telephone number or temporarily assigned network address, and
method of payment. 17 “Although the line between [content and
non-content] occasionally blurs, in most cases the line is clear: it is
the line between a message that a person wants to communicate
and information about when and how he does so.” 18 Under the
SCA, data associated with a subscriber or customer is non-content,
whereas information contained in the communication itself is
content.
According to the SCA, a court order issued under 18 U.S.C. §
2703(c) for non-content records “shall issue only if the
governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a
wire or electronic communication, or the records or other
information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation.” 19 This court order is “something like a mix
between a subpoena and a search warrant. . . . If the judge finds
that the factual showing has been made, the judge signs the order.
The order is then served like an ordinary subpoena . . .” 20 The
order does not require notification to the customer or subscriber
when the government requests non-content records under
paragraph (c). 21
II. IN RE APPLICATION OF THE U.S. FOR AN ORDER PURSUANT
22
TO 18 U.S.C. §2703(D)
In a memorandum opinion issued on November 10, 2011, a
federal district court judge in Virginia addressed the limitations of
17

18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) (2010).
Kerr, supra note 13, 1228.
19
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2010).
20
Kerr, supra note 13, 1219.
21
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(3) (2010). The requirements for accessing content
information are far more complex and vary in part based on whether the content
has been in “electronic storage” more or less than 180 days. See WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, 2 CRIM. PROC. §
4.8(D) (3d ed. 2011).
22
830 F. Supp. 2d 114 (E.D. Va. Nov. 10, 2011).
18
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the Fourth Amendment right to privacy with regard to Internet
communications. The opinion affirms a United States magistrate
judge’s rulings regarding an order of production issued under the
SCA that allowed the government to obtain non-content records
regarding Twitter users without a warrant. Petitioners, three
alleged members of the WikiLeaks organization 23 facing potential
criminal charges over public disclosure of classified information
about the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, moved to quash the order,
unseal the application seeking the order, and publicly docket other
related information on a variety of grounds, including a
constitutional claim based on the Fourth Amendment right to
privacy. In denying petitioners’ motions, the judge noted that
gaining online access requires all Internet users to transmit IP
address information associated with their personal computing
devices out of private home spaces and onto online routers that
then convey traffic to specific websites. Combined with Twitter’s
privacy policy, which resulted in application of the Fourth
Amendment’s third-party doctrine, the nature of Internet data
transmission led the judge to conclude that Twitter users have no
expectation of privacy regarding the numerical IP addresses that
identify their computers, cellular phones, or other mobile devices
that connect to the Internet when using Twitter.
A. Factual Context
As part of an ongoing criminal investigation into alleged leaks
of classified United States military documents related to the Iraq
and Afghanistan wars, the federal government sought a court order
based on 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) instructing Twitter, Inc. to turn over
information pertaining to three individuals under grand jury
investigation. 24 The government alleged that the three
23

WikiLeaks is an international, online, self-described “not-for-profit media
organisation” that seeks to publish original source material and news stories
based on information leaked from a variety of anonymous sources. About,
WIKILEAKS.COM, http://wikileaks.org/About.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2013).
24
In re Application, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 117; Scott Shane & John F. Burns,
U.S. Subpoenas Twitter Over WikiLeaks Supporters, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/world/09wiki.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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individuals—Jacob Appelbaum, a resident and citizen of the
United States and a computer security expert, Rop Gonggrijp, a
Dutch citizen and a computer security expert, and Birgitta
Jonsdottir, a citizen and resident of Iceland, and a member of the
Icelandic parliament—acted as members of the Wikileaks
organization and performed criminal acts related to the release of
classified U.S. government documents. 25 The three were alleged to
be subscribers and users of Twitter, and used the Internet to
communicate with the Twitter social networking site. 26
B. Procedural Posture
Upon ex parte application by the government, Magistrate
Judge Theresa Carroll Buchanan issued an order instructing
Twitter to produce specific electronic records to the government. 27
Twitter responded with a motion to unseal the order. On January 5,
2011, based on Twitter’s motion and the government’s consent, the
magistrate judge unsealed the order, finding that it was in the best
interest of the investigation. 28 The magistrate judge also authorized
Twitter to disclose the order to Appelbaum, Gonggrijp, and
Jonsdottir. 29
In response, the three individuals filed a motion to vacate the
order, and a motion to unseal certain other court records pertaining
to the order and publicly docket all orders issued under 18 U.S.C. §
2703. 30 The individuals based their motions on a variety of
grounds, including a constitutional claim based on the Fourth
Amendment right to privacy. 31
After briefing from both parties, Magistrate Judge Buchanan
issued an order and memorandum opinion denying the motion to
vacate, granting in part the motion to unseal, and keeping under

25

In re Application, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 117.
Id.
27
Id. at 121.
28
Id. at 122.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 127.
26
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advisement the issue of public docketing. 32 In her memorandum
opinion, Magistrate Judge Buchanan found that the individuals
lacked standing to challenge the order, that issuance of the order
was proper under the SCA, and that issuance of the order did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. 33 Then, on June 1, 2011,
Magistrate Judge Buchanan issued an order and memorandum
opinion denying the request for public docketing. 34 Appelbaum,
Gonggrijp, and Jonsdottir filed objections to both orders. 35
C. Building on Prior Precedent
On November 10, 2011, Federal District Court Judge Liam
O’Grady affirmed the rulings of Magistrate Judge Buchanan,
finding that the individuals lacked statutory standing. 36 The judge
further found that the order of production issued under the SCA
that allowed the government to obtain non-content Twitter
information was valid, did not require a warrant, and did not
violate any Fourth Amendment right to privacy. 37
In denying petitioners’ motions, Judge O’Grady noted that
gaining online access requires all Internet users to transmit IP
address information associated with their personal computing
devices out of private home spaces and onto online routers that
then convey traffic to specific websites. 38 Combined with Twitter’s
privacy policy, which resulted in application of the Fourth
Amendment’s third-party doctrine, the nature of Internet data
transmission led the judge to conclude that Twitter users have no
expectation of privacy regarding the numerical IP addresses that
identify their computers, cellular phones or other mobile devices
that connect to the Internet when using Twitter. 39
The court first addressed locational privacy issues raised by the
32

Id. at 122.
Id. at 127.
34
Id. at 122.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 128-29.
37
Id. at 129-30, 138.
38
Id. at 135.
39
Id. at 138.
33
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possible use of non-content data. The court distinguished United
States v. Karo, 40 noting that the case at bar did not involve
surveillance of something that had been withdrawn from view, but
rather something that was transmitted from a private space into a
public space, and that Twitter, not the government, recorded the
information. 41 That such information could be used to pinpoint the
location of the user did not worry the court, as “[t]he Fourth
Circuit has explicitly approved the collection of non-IP subscriber
information” to pinpoint the location of a party. 42 In essence, the
court distinguished the facts of this case from those of Karo,
focusing on the entity making the transmission and the entity
recording the data. In addition, the court explained that, assuming
arguendo that the government was able to track user movements
based upon IP address data, “IP addresses are no more revealing
about the contents of communication than are phone numbers.” 43
Just as the government “may be able to make educated guesses
about what was said, simply based on non-content information
about the parties involved in the communication” using telephone
numbers, so too may the government perform similar guesswork
with IP addresses. 44
The court then examined the impact of the third-party doctrine
on the privacy claim. The court noted the history of the third-party
doctrine, looking to United States v. Miller, 45 and Smith v.
Maryland. 46 The court explained:
Like the defendant in Smith [relied on the phone
company to connect calls], Petitioners relied on
Internet technology to access Twitter, indicating an
intention to relinquish control of whatever
information would be necessary to complete their
communication.
They
knew
that
their
communications with Twitter would be transmitted
40

468 U.S. 705 (1984).
In re Application, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 131-33.
42
Id. at 133 (citing U.S. v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 164 n.2 (2010)).
43
Id. at 138.
44
Id.
45
425 U.S. 435 (1976).
46
442 U.S. 735 (1979).
41
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out of private spaces and onto the Internet for
routing to Twitter. 47
Analogizing the defendant’s voluntary disclosure of information to
the phone company when dialing a phone from within his home in
Smith to the act of the petitioners in the case at bar in disclosing
their IP addresses to Twitter, the court concluded that “[b]oth
phone numbers and IP addresses must be revealed to
intermediaries as a practical necessity of completing
communications over their respective networks.” 48
The court pointed to two prior cases to support its conclusion
that IP addresses are analogous to telephone numbers. In U.S. v.
Christie, the defendant was convicted of possession of thousands
of images of child pornography and of various child-pornographyrelated offenses. 49 The defendant appealed, based in part on an
argument that the government's acquisition of his IP address
violated his Fourth Amendment rights and thus evidence gathered
related to his activity on a child pornography website should have
been suppressed. 50 The Third Circuit rejected this argument,
analogizing an IP address to other subscriber information and
holding that “no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in an IP
address.” 51 Likewise, in United States v. Forrester, a defendant
convicted of conspiracy to manufacture ecstasy and various other
offenses related to the operation of a large ecstasy-manufacturing
laboratory challenged the validity of a government computer
surveillance program that enabled the government to learn, among
other things, the IP addresses of the websites that he visited. 52
Comparing the gathering of IP address data with the use of a pen
register in Smith, 53 the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
government’s actions were not a search within Fourth Amendment
purposes. 54
47

In re Application, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 135.
Id.
49
624 F.3d 558, 562 (3d Cir. 2010).
50
Id. at 567.
51
Id. at 574.
52
512 F.3d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 2007).
53
442 U.S. 735 (1979).
54
Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510.
48
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The court also distinguished the facts of the Twitter case from
those of two other situations that courts have faced. First, the court
noted that the petitioners reliance on United States v. Warshak 55
was misplaced because Warshak dealt with an order seeking
emails—in other words, content. 56 In contrast, the government
sought only non-content records in the case at bar. 57 Similarly, the
Court concluded that United States v. Heckenkamp 58 was
“inapposite because the intrusion at issue [in Heckenkamp] was a
remote search of the defendant's computer, which included running
commands and examining files stored on the defendant's personal
computer.” 59 Whereas “[p]ersonal computers are ordinarily treated
like closed containers under the Fourth Amendment,” the noncontent data the users transmitted to Twitter moved from a private
space into a public space. 60
Thus, relying in large part on previous decisions, the Court
determined Twitter users lack a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the IP data transmitted as part of their communication with the
website.
III. IMPACT ON ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES AND USERS
A. Non-Content Data is Not Private or Protected
Application of the SCA to social networking sites appears to
limit any privacy interests that end users have in information
conveyed to the social media service providers, at least in noncontent information. Under this court’s analysis, it does not appear
that the Fourth Amendment would ever protect non-content
information contained in or associated with IP addresses. As the
Court states, “[The Petitioners] also implicitly consented to
disclosure of their IP address information to Twitter as a practical

55

631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
In re Application, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 137.
57
Id.
58
482 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2007).
59
In re Application, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 137.
60
Id.
56
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necessity of using Internet technology.” 61 IP addresses are
necessary to route communications over the Internet. Such a result
is consistent with prior decisions and represents a natural
expansion of prior precedent. 62 The distinction between content
and non-content, as well as the distinction between private and
public spaces, remain firm.
The conclusions of others who have considered the application
of the SCA to analogous situations also bolster this decision. 63
Because the nature of online communication requires disclosure of
IP address data into public space and to a third party, even when
transmitted from a personal computer located in a private space,
social networking site users and operators should be on notice that
no expectation of privacy exists in IP address data transmitted over
the Internet.
B. Non-Content Data is Collected and Retained
Social networking sites will continue to track and retain noncontent data, including IP address information. For example, both
Twitter and Facebook include explicit messages about retaining IP
address information in their respective privacy policies. 64 Twitter
61

Id. at 139.
See e.g., U.S. v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 574 (3d Cir. 2010); U.S. v.
Forrester, 512 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2007).
63
See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 13, 1210 (“[B]y communicating with their
ISPs, Internet users have revealed information to their ISPs and have
relinquished their Fourth Amendment rights in that information.”); People v.
Malcolm Harris, 949 N.Y.S.2d 590 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. June 30, 2012).
64
According to Twitter, “Our servers automatically record information (Log
Data) created by your use of the Services. Log Data may include information
such as your IP address, browser type, operating system, the referring web page,
pages visited, location, your mobile carrier, device and application IDs, search
terms, and cookie information.” Twitter Privacy Policy, TWITTER.COM, June 23,
2011, http://twitter.com/privacy. Likewise, Facebook states, “We receive data
from the computer, mobile phone or other device you use to access Facebook,
including when multiple users log in from the same device. This may include
your IP address and other information about things like your internet service,
location, the type (including identifiers) of browser you use, or the pages you
visit.” Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK.COM, https://www.facebook.com/about/
privacy/your-info (last visited Jan. 3, 2013).
62
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informs users that in most cases it will only retain such data for 18
months, after which it will either delete it or remove “common
account identifiers” (such as username, full IP address, or email
address); 65 Facebook retains data until an account has been
deleted. 66
That private companies are retaining non-content data does not
appear to worry the court in this case. After noting that IP
addresses are necessary to route communications over the Internet,
the court continued:
The fact that Twitter chose to record IP address
information pertaining to [the Twitter users], and
the purpose for which it did so, makes no
difference. . . . As the Supreme Court stated in
Smith [v. Maryland], the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment cannot be dictated by the recordkeeping practices of a private corporation. (“We are
not inclined to make a crazy quilt of the Fourth
Amendment, especially in circumstances where (as
here) the pattern of protection would be dictated by
billing practices of a private corporation.”). 67
Non-content data is necessarily transmitted and routinely retained.
Social networking companies collect and retain non-content data
because users necessarily provide it—making it pervasive and
uniform. Non-content data helps companies provide more
personalized service, and can be used to monetize social
networking sites through targeted advertising. And regardless of
why non-content data is retained, privacy interests found in the
Fourth Amendment or the SCA do not protect it.

65

Twitter Privacy Policy, TWITTER.COM, June 23, 2011, http://twitter.com/
privacy.
66
Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK.COM, https://www.facebook.com/about/
privacy/your-info (last visited Jan. 3, 2013).
67
In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§2703(d), 830 F. Supp. 2d 114, 137-38 (E.D. Va. Nov. 10, 2011) (internal
citation omitted).
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CONCLUSION
In deciding In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. §2703(d), a federal district court in Virginia affirmed
that the federal government can legally obtain a Twitter user’s IP
address and other non-content information associated with the user
without first providing notice to the user. This decision represents
a natural expansion of existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
applying the SCA, and gives both users and operators of social
networking sites notice that there is no expectation of privacy for
IP address data transmitted over the Internet—even when the data
is transmitted from a personal computer located in a private space.
The nature of online communication itself requires that machines
disclose non-content data, meaning that under the SCA, the data
required for using the Internet is inherently non-private. Internet
users lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in the IP data and
other non-content information they transmit as part of their
communication with a website.
PRACTICE POINTERS


All social networking companies should employ
“clickwrap” agreements and/or privacy policies that put
users on notice regarding the company’s retention of noncontent data.



Internet users should be aware that social networking sites
(as well as a host of other sites) retain non-content data for
a variety of purposes.



Courts will likely continue to analogize IP address
information to telephone numbers when performing any
Fourth Amendment analysis.

